1. The first ε-theorem: If A( e) is derivable in the ε-calculus ( e a tuple of ε-terms), then there are tuples terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that A( t 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ A( t n ) is provable in the elementary calculus. 2. The second ε-theorem: If A ε is the standard ε-translation a first-order formula derivable in the ε-calculus, A is derivable in first-order logic.
The first ε-theorem has two important consequences. The first consequence is a conservativity result, which we may call the weak first ε-theorem: If A is ε-free and derivable in the ε-calculus, it is derivable in the elementary calculus of free variables (i.e., without critical formulas, indeed, without any use of ε-terms). If identity is not present, this implies that the ε-calculus is conservative over propositional logic for quantifier-free formulas. The second consequence is Herbrand's theorem for existential formulas: If ∃ x A( x) is provable in the ε-calculus, then some disjunction A( t 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ A( t n ) is provable in propositional logic alone, i.e., is a tautology.
These results are obtained by manipulating derivations, i.e., by eliminating ε-terms and critical formulas from derivations. The first and the second ε-theorem are related, both conceptually and in Hilbert's proofs, to Herbrand's theorem. According to it, for every prenex formulas in first-order logic there is a purely existential formula (with additional function symbols)-its Herbrand form-which is provable iff the former is. A disjunction of the sort produced by the first ε-theorem is called a Herbrand disjunction. It has the property that from it the original formula can be proved in first-order logic. And in fact, this is how the proof of the second ε-theorem proceeds: Suppose a prenex formula is provable in the ε-calculus. From the proof we obtain a proof of its (purely existential) Herbrand form. Now apply the first ε-theorem to obtain its Herbrand disjunction. The Herbrand disjunction is provable in propositional logic alone, and from it we can recover the original formula using only first-order logic without ε-terms or critical formulas.
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Hilbert's results make essential use of classical principles, especially the law of excluded middle. The question naturally arises whether the results can also be obtained for weaker logics, and whether the same proof methods can be used, i.e., whether the use of excluded middle can be avoided. In order to to make headway, we restrict our considerations to pure intermediate logics, i.e., logics between intuitionistic and classical logic. Well-known examples are Jankov's logic of weak excluded middle and the Gödel-Dummett logics of linearly ordered Heyting algebras or Kripke frames. We make this restriction for two reasons. One is that Hilbert's methods rely essentially on the deduction theorem, and this holds in intermediate logics but not in many other logics. The other is that ε-calculi for intuitionistic and intermediate logics are of independent interest. What is the effect of adding ε-operators to intermediate logics? When does the first ε-theorem hold? When is the ε-calculus for a logic conservative over the propositional base logic? We also, for the most part, discuss only pure logics, i.e., logics without identity, since identity results in much more complicated systems and proofs, even already in the classical case.
In order to carry out this investigation, it is useful to introduce a dual τ -operator which defines the universal quantifier. Whereas A(ε x A(x)) translates ∃x A(x), A(τ x A(x)) translates ∀x A(x). The corresponding critical formulas are those of the form A(τ x A(x))→A(t). Weakening the logic makes the addition of τ necessary as the equivalence of ∀x A(x) and A(ε x ¬A(x)) relies on the schema of contraposition; the equivalence of ∀x A(x) and A(τ x A(x)) does not. The system resulting from a propositional intermediate logic L by adding ε-and τ -terms and critical formulas is called the ετ -calculus for L.
It is well known that adding the ε-operator to intutionistic logic in a straightforward way is not conservative. Mints [1977] , [1990] has investigated different systems based on intuitionistic logic with ε-operators which are conservative and in which the ε-theorem holds. He allows the use of ε-terms only when ∃x A(x) has been established; other approaches (e.g., Shirai [1971] ) use existence predicates to accomplish the same. We investigate the basic ετ -calculus without this assumption; i.e., we treat the ετ -calculus syntactically as a calculus of (something like) Skolem functions rather than semantically as a choice operator. §2. Summary of Results. We establish the following main results:
1. In the ετ -calculus for an intermediate logic, all quantifier shift principles are provable. Thus, the ετ -calculus is not conservative over an intermediate predicate logic in which these principles are not provable (Proposition 4.1). 2. The ετ -calculus for any intermediate logic L is always a conservative extension of L. Hence, non-conservativity phenomena are restricted to first-order formulas (Theorem 5.3). 3. The first ε-theorem holds only in finite-valued Gödel logics (Theorems 6.2 and 9.14). 4. However, the weak first ε-theorem holds also in infinite-valued Gödel-Dummett logic LC (Theorem 9.15).
The results also apply to classical logic, of course, and give new information about possible strategies for proving the first ε-theorem there. We begin (Sections 3 and 4) by considering the differences in formulas provable in a logic vs. those provable in the corresponding ετ -calculus. This is essentially the question of whether the addition of ε-and τ -terms and critical formulas allows the derivation (or requires the validity) of formulas not provable in the base logic. In the classical case, it does not: the weak first ε-theorem implies conservativity over propositional logic for quantifier-free formulas, and the second ε-theorem implies conservativity for first-order formulas. These results hold also in the presence of identity. However, the addition of ε-and τ -operators to intuitionistic logic is not conservative. This is well known; we investigate in more detail which intuitionistically invalid formulas are provable in ετ -calculi. We show that quantifier shift schemas play a special role here (sentences which express that quantifiers shift into or out of disjunctions, conjunctions, and conditionals). All but three of these are valid in intuitionistic logic. The addition of ε-terms and critical formulas results in the provability of the remaining three. Consequently, no intermediate first-order logic in which one of these three quantifier shifts is unprovable can have the second ε-theorem. This includes intuitionistic logic itself, logics complete for non-constant domain Kripke frames, and infinite-valued Gödel-Dummett logic.
We show that conservativity for the propositional fragment does hold for all intermediate logics (Section 5).
2 The proof of this result does not need Hilbert's involved proof-theoretic methods and also applies to classical logic. This in itself is a surprising result, even though the proof is very easy.
2 Bell [1993] , DeVidi [1995] have shown that it does not hold for derivations from theories in intuitionistic logic when identity is present: the presence of a = b for constants a, b is enough to derive De Morgan's law from H with identity plus ε-terms and critical formulas. Mulvihill [2015] gave another proof, not requiring identity, but other quantified axioms. Their calculi differ somwhat from ours. See Section 14.
Our main results concern the first ε-theorem for intermediate logics. We show that whenever it holds, the underlying logic must prove (or validate) a sentence B m of the form
This means that very few intermediate logics satisfy the first ε-theorem. For instance, they are not provable in intuitionistic logic, any logic complete for Kripke frames with branching worlds, or in infinite-valued Gödel-Dummett logic. The only intermediate logics in which B m are provable are the finite-valued Gödel logics (Section 6).
Provability of B m is also a sufficient condition: We show that the first ε-theorem holds whenever the underlying logic proves at least one B m . The proof follows the idea of Hilbert's proof, but does not make use of excluded middle. In order to establish the result, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the proof of the first ε-theorem. We introduce the notion of an elimination set, that is, a set of terms which can replace an ε-term in a proof and render the corresponding critical formulas redundant using only the resources of the underlying propositional logic.
We first discuss elimination sets for classical logic and excluded middle (Section 7), and then for finite-valued Gödel logic and the propositional principles B m (Section 8). If such elimination sets exist, the procedure given by Hilbert and Bernays can be used for a proof of the first ε-theorem. By putting emphasis on elimination sets we can also show that in logics in which the first ε-theorem does not hold in general, it may still hold for formulas of a special form. This allows us to show that the first ετ -theorem holds for negated formulas in Jankov's logic of weak excluded middle and in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The weak first ε-theorem, where the formula proved contains no ετ -terms, also holds for infinite-valued Gödel logic (Section 9).
The first ετ -theorem is closely related to Herbrand's theorem. We discuss this connection, as well as the second ετ -theorem, in Section 10.
In the case of some proofs, it is possible to eliminate ετ -terms in a simplified way where the cases that require the presence of B m do not arise. Although we cannot give an independent characterization of the proofs or theorems for which this is the case, the simplified procedure will sometimes terminate and produce a Herbrand disjunction. Conversely, if a Herbrand disjunction exists, there is always a proof of the original formula for which the procedure terminates and produces the Herbrand disjunction (Section 11). This result sheds light on the conditions under which (a version of) Hilbert's method which uses principles weaker than excluded middle produces a Herbrand disjunction. In fact, a similar method can be used to give a partial ε-elimination procedure for number theory, where linearity of the natural order of N plays a similar role as the schema of linearity does in the case of logic (Section 12). §3. ετ -Calculi for Intermediate Logics. An intermediate logic L is a set of formulas that contains intuitionistic logic H and is contained in classical logic C, and is closed under modus ponens and substitution. For intermediate predicate logics, we also require closure under the universal and existential quantifier rules.
Intermediate propositional logics have been investigated extensively since the 1950s. Intermediate predicate logics are comparatively less well understood; however, they constitute an active area of research (see Gabbay, Shehtman, and Skvortsov [2009] ).
Suppose L is a propositional intermediate logic. It is always possible to consider the corresponding "elementary calculus of free variables," i.e., the system obtained by replacing propositional letters with atomic formulas of a first-order language, with or without identity. For the most part, we will assume identity is not present, i.e., we consider pure intermediate logics. The following intermediate propositional logics will play important roles here:
1. LC, characterized alternatively as the formulas valid on linearly ordered Kripke frames or as infinite-valued Gdel logic, 3 axiomatized over H using the schema
2. LC m = LC+B m , characterized as formulas valid on linearly ordered Kripke frames of height < m, or as the Gödel logic on m truth values, also known as S m−1 [Hosoi 1966 ]. Here, B m is:
3. KC, the logic of weak excluded middle [Jankov 1968 ], axiomatized over H using the schema
Definition 3.1. Suppose L is an intermediate logic.
A proof π of A from Γ in the corresponding elementary calculus of free variables is a sequence A 1 , . . . , A n of quantifier-free formulas of predicate logic such that each A i is either a substitution instance of a formula in L, is in Γ, or follows from formulas A k and A l (k, l < i) by modus ponens, and A n ≡ A. We then write Γ ⊢ π L A. If such a proof π exists we write Γ ⊢ L and if Γ is empty, simply L ⊢ A. If we leave out L, we mean H.
Intermediate predicate logics contain intuitionistic predicate logic QH and are closed under substitution, modus ponens, and the usual quantifier rules,
which are subject to the eigenvariable condition: x must not be free in the conclusion. Some of these are obtained from QH simply by adding propositional axiom schemes. Equivalently, they can be obtained by expanding a propositional intermediate logic L to a language with predicates and terms, the standard quantifier axioms ∀x A(x) → A(t) and
and closing under substitution, modus ponens, and the quantifier rules. This results in the weakest pure intermediate predicate logic extending L. For instance, QLC is the weakest first-order logic obtained from LC, and is axiomatized by QH + Lin. It is complete for linearly-ordered Kripke frames (see Corsi [1992] , Skvortsov [2005] ). Not every intermediate predicate logic is obtained in this way, as it is possible to consistently add additional first-order principles to L. Some important first-order principles are, e.g., the constant domain principle
the double negation shift (or Kuroda's principle),
and the quantifier shifts
QLC + CD axiomatizes the formulas valid in linearly-ordered Kripke frames with constant domains, and also the first-order Gödel logic G R of formulas valid on the interval [0, 1] [Baaz, Preining, and Zach 2007] . QH + K characterizes the formulas valid on Kripke frames with the McKinsey property, and so QLC + CD + K is the logic of linear Kripke frames with maximal element [Skvortsov 2005] . It is also the first-order Gödel logic G 0 of formulas valid on {0} ∪ [1/2, 1].
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QLC+B m is not complete, contrary to what one might expect, for linear Kripke frames of height < m. However G m = QLC m + CD is complete for linearly ordered Kripke frames of height < m with constant domains. It is also the m-valued first-order Gödel logic G m . Given any propositional logic L, one can introduce the ε-operator by allowing for terms of the form ε x A(x) for any formula A(x) with x free. One then introduces all formulas of the form A(t) → A(ε x A(x)) as new axioms. These formulas are the critical formulas belonging to ε x A(x).
In classical logic, it is possible to define the existential quantifier by ∃x A(x) ≡ ε x A(x). Since ∃ and ∀ are classically interdefinable, the universal quantifier can be defined via ∀x A(x) ≡ A(ε x ¬A(x)). In intermediate logics other than classical logic, ∀ and ∃ are not interdefinable. Hence, here it is advisable to treat ∀ separately and introduce a dual version of the ε-operator, traditionally called the τ -operator. A critical formula belonging to A(τ x A(x)) is any formula of the form A(τ x A(x)) → A(t). The dual correspondence is given by ∀x A(x) ≡ A(τ x A(x)). We call ε-and τ -terms collectively ετ -terms.
As usual, we consider ε-and τ -terms to be identical up to renaming of bound variables, and define substitution of ετ -terms into formulas (e.g., A(εxA(x))) so that bound variables are tacitly renamed so as to avoid clashes. 
We write Lετ ⊢ B if such a π exists, or Γ ⊢ π Lετ B when we want to identify the critical formulas and the proof π.
We would like to compare intermediate predicate logics QL to the ετ -calculus Lετ of their propositional fragment L. Since the language of Lετ does not contain quantifiers, we must define a translation of first-order formulas that do contain them into the language of the ετ -calculus.
Definition 3.3. The ετ -translation A ετ of a formula A is defined as follows:
Again, substitution of ετ -terms for variables must be understood modulo renaming of bound variables so as to avoid clashes.
The point of the classical ε-calculus is that it can replace quantifiers and quantifier inferences. And indeed, in classical first-order logic, a first-order formula A is provable iff its translation A ε is provable in the pure ε-calculus. The "if" direction is the content of the second ε-theorem, while the "only if" direction follows more simply by translating derivations.
We defined the ετ -calculus on the basis of a propositional logic L. It is also possible to define an "extended" ετ -calculus by adding ετ -terms and critical formulas to the full first-order language including quantifiers, and then considering proofs in QL from critical formulas. Let's call the calculus so obtained QLετ . Clearly, if A is quantifier-free and Lετ ⊢ A then QLετ ⊢ A. One may wonder, however, if QLετ is stronger than Lετ in the sense that for some formulas A, QLετ ⊢ A but not Lετ ⊢ A ετ . This is not so as long as the ετ -translations of the quantifier axioms of QL are provable in Lετ ; then the extended ε-calculus is conservative over the pure ε-calculus. Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of A. If A is an axiom in QL, A ετ is either also an axiom in Lετ (if A is not a quantifier axiom) or it is derivable in Lετ (if A is a quantifier axiom, by hypothesis).
If B → A(x) is derivable and x is not free in B, then so is B → A(τ x A(x)), by substituting τ x A(x) everywhere x appears free in the derivation, and renaming bound variables to avoid clashes. Similarly, if B(x) → A is derivable, so is
The examples of intermediate predicate logics we consider satisfy the condition of the theorem. The standard quantifier axioms translate directly into critical formulas:
As we'll see in Section 4, the quantifier axioms of several other intermediate predicate logics also satisfy the condition that their ετ -translations are derivable from critical formulas alone. 
Proof. In each case, one direction is an instance of the corresponding quantifier axiom, and the other direction follows from a critical formula by the corresponding quantifier rule. For instance, A(ε x A(x)) → ∃x A is an axiom in QLετ , and from the critical formula A(x) → A(ε x A(x)) we get ∃x A → A(ε x A(x)) by the ∃-rule, since x is not free in A(ε x A(x)). ⊣ Proposition 3.7. If QL satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.4, then QLετ ⊢ A ↔ A ετ .
Proof. Since QL includes QH, the substitution rule B↔C ⊢ D(B)↔D(C) is admissible. The result follows by induction on complexity of A and the previous proposition.
⊣ §4. Critical Formulas and Quantifier Shifts. We will show later (Theorem 5.3) that any ετ -calculus for an intermediate logic L is conservative over L. It is well-known that ετ -calculus over intuitionistic logic is not conservative over intuitionistic predicate logic. Classical ε-calculus, however, is conservative over classical logic. That is the content of the second ε-theorem, which says that for any formula A not containing ε-terms but possibly containing quantifiers, if A ετ is provable in the classical ε-calculus, then A is already provable in the predicate calculus. We'll show now that for any intermediate logic L, the ετ -translations of all classically valid quantifier shift principles are provable from critical formulas.
Quantifier shift formulas divide into two kinds. On the one hand, we have those conditionals that yield an outside existential quantifier or an inside universal quantifier in the consequent of the conditional. Their ετ -translations are critical formulas, and hence provable in Lετ (see Table 4 ).
The other formulas are provable from critical formulas together with some propositional principles, all of which are intuitionistically provable and hence provable in all intermediate logics. For instance, to obtain the ετ -translation of Table 1 . Quantifier shift formulas whose ετ -translations are critical formulas. In each case, x is not free in B, and the ετ -translation of the quantifier shift formula on the left is C(t 1 ) → C(t 2 ).
Apply modus ponens to it and the principle
This same pattern works in all cases, the required critical formulas A 1 → A 2 and propositional principles are given in Table 4 . The most interesting quantifier shift formulas here are CD , Q ∀ , and Q ∃ , since they are not intuitionistically valid. By contrast, we have:
Proof. (1) They are critical formulas; see Table 4. (2) Follows from Proposition 3.7. ⊣ Note that the only intuitionistically invalid De Morgan rule for quantifiers,
is a special case of (Q ∀ ), taking ⊥ for B; (Q) ετ is a critical formula. The ετ -translation of double negation shift K ετ is
and is also a critical formula. In classical first-order logic, both the addition of ε-operators and critical formulas and the replacement of quantifiers by ε-operators is conservative. The previous results show that for extensions of first-order intuitionistic logic, this is not the case: intuitionistically invalid quantified formulas (or their ετ -translations) Table 2 . Proofs of ετ -translations of quantifier shift formulas.
In each case, x is not free in B, A 1 →A 2 is a critical formula, the ετ -translation of the formula is given on the left. The propositional principle on the right is provable in intuitionistic logic, and the ετ -translation of the quantifier shift formula follows by one application of modus ponens.
become provable. However, these quantifier shifts are provable in some intermediate logics, e.g., in some Gödel logics. We might think of ετ -terms semantically as terms for objects which serve the role of generics taking on the role of quantifiers, and indeed in classical logic this connection is very close. Because of the validity of
in classical logic, there always is an object x which behaves as an ε-term (A(x) holds iff ∃x A(x) holds), and an object x which behaves as a τ -term (i.e., A(x) holds iff ∀y A(y) holds). One might expect then that Wel 1 and Wel 2 , when added to QH, have the same effect as adding critical formulas, i.e., that all quantifier shifts become provable. Note that Wel 1 and Wel 2 are intuitionistically equivalent to
Lετ is Conservative over L. It is a consequence of the first ε-theorem that ε-free formulas provable in the pure ε-calculus are already provable in the elementary calculus of free variables. In particular, the ε-calculus is conservative over propositional logic. Work by Bell [1993] and DeVidi [1995] shows that, however, the addition of critical formulas to intuitionistic logic results in inuitionistically invalid propositional formulas becoming provable in certain simple theories. These results require the presence of identity axioms. One may wonder if these results can be strengthened to the pure logic and the ετ -calculus alone. The following proposition shows that this is not the case. The addition of critical formulas to intermediate logics alone does not have any effects on the propositional level.
Definition 5.1. The shadow A s of a formula is defined as follows:
where X P is a propositional variable and ⊤ is any theorem of L.
A first-order intermediate logic QL is preserved under shadow essentially if all its quantifier axioms and rules remain provable if the first-order structure and the quantifiers are removed. In particular, for the two standard quantifier axioms we have (∀x
s .) For the quantifier rules, the shadows of premise and conclusion are identical, e.g.,
The shadows of identity axioms are: (t = t) s ≡ ⊤ and
s . Both are provable in H with identity. All intermediate first-order logics mentioned above are preserved under shadow. They are axiomatized by various quantifier shift principles. As we have seen in the preceding section, the ετ -translations of all such quantifier shift principles become provable in the corresponding ετ -calculus. However, the shadow of such a quantifier shift principle is a formula of the form B → B.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose QL extends L and is preserved under shadow. If
s . This also holds if identity axioms are present.
Proof. The shadows of critical formulas and identity axioms are provable in H. ⊣ As a consequence, we have the following conservativity result for all intermediate ετ -calculi:
Theorem 5.3. If QL extends L and is preserved under shadow, then QLετ is conservative over L for propositional formulas. In particular, no new propositional formulas become provable by the addition of critical formulas in any intermediate logic, including intuitionistic logic itself. §6. The First ετ -Theorem Fails unless L ⊢ B m . In classical first-order logic, the main result about the ε-calculus is the first ε-theorem. It states that if A(e 1 , . . . , e n ), where the e i are ε-terms, is provable in the pure ε-calculus, then there are ε-free terms t j i such that
is provable in classical propositional logic alone. Such ε-terms e i appear as the result of translating ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) into the ε-calculus.
In the context of intermediate logics, we may formulate the statement as follows:
Definition 6.1. An intermediate logic L has the first ετ -theorem, if, whenever Lετ ⊢ A(e 1 , . . . , e n ) for some ε-or τ -terms e 1 , . . . , e n , then there are ετ -free terms t
. We obtain a first negative result: if Lετ has the first epsilon theorem, then an instance of B m , i.e.,
for some m ≥ 2 is provable already in the propositional fragment L.
6 This rules out a first ετ -theorem for, e.g., ετ -calculi for intuitionistic logic and infinitevalued Gödel logic.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose Lετ has the first ετ -theorem. Then L ⊢ B m for some m ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider Let A(z) ≡ (P (f (z)) → P (z)) and ∃z A(z), i.e., ∃z(P (f (z))→P (z)). (Note that this is the Herbrand form of ∃z∀u(P (u)→P (z)).
Note that U is of the form P (t) → P (ε x P (x)), so it is a critical formula. Also note that U → V is of the form A(t) → A(e), and so U → V is also a critical formula.
Since L ⊢ (U →V )→(U →V ), and U →V and U are critical formulas, Lετ ⊢ V . By assumption, Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, so L proves a disjunction of the form
6 For m = 2, this schema is equivalent to A ∨ ¬A: take ⊤ for A 1 , A for A 2 , ⊥ for A 3 .
for some terms t 1 , . . . , t n . (This is a Herbrand disjunction of ∃z A(z).) Each term t i is of the form f j (s) for some j ≥ 0 and a term s which does not start with f . By rearranging the disjuncts to group disjuncts with the same innermost term s together (using commutativity of ∨) and by adding additional disjuncts as needed (using weakening), from this we obtain a formula
) by A i in the proof of the last formula and contract identical disjuncts. This yields a proof of (
LC n (Proposition 6.5). By contrast, no B m is provable in intuitionistic logic H, Jankov logic KC, or in infinite-valued Gödel logic LC (Proposition 6.3).
Proof. 
Proof. Hosoi [1966] showed that the n-valued Gödel logic is axiomatized by H + R n−1 , where R n is
By simultaneously substituting ⊤ for A 1 , and ⊥ for A n+1 , and
Furthermore, Hosoi [1967, Lemma 4 Corollary 6.6. Intuitionistic logic H, Jankov logic KC, and infinite-valued Gödel logic LC do not have the first ετ -theorem.
We have restricted L here to be an intermediate logic. However, it bears remarking that Theorem 6.2 does not require that L contains H. An inspection of the proof shows that all that is required is that L ⊢ A → A, and in L, ∨ is provably commutative, associative, and idempotent, and has weakening (L ⊢ A → (A ∨ B) ). Thus, Corollary 6.6 applies to any ετ -calculus based on a logic which has these properties (such as, say, Lukasiewicz logic.)
The first ε-theorem in classical logic shows that if an existential formula ∃x A(x) is provable, so is a disjunction of instances i A(t i ). Clearly this is equivalent to: if ∀x A(x) → B is provable so is A(t i ) → B. Without the interdefinability of ∀ and ∃, the question arises whether the alternative form of the ε-theorem might hold in an intermediate ετ -calculus even if the standard form does not. We'll show that the versions are, in fact, equivalent even in intermediate logics.
Proposition 6.7. The following are equivalent:
Proof.
(1) implies (3): Suppose
By the deduction theorem,
By (1) we have terms s i , t i so that
by the deduction theorem.
(3) clearly implies (1) and (2).
(2) implies (1): Let X be a propositional variable. A ⊢ H (A → X) → X. So if Lετ ⊢ A(e) then by the deduction theorem,
A(e) → X ⊢ Lετ X and by (2),
The formula on the left is provable intuitionistically.
⊣ §7. Elimination Sets and Excluded Middle. The basic idea of Hilbert's proof of the first ε-theorem is this: Suppose we have a proof of E ≡ D(e) from critical formulas Γ, Λ(e), where e is a critical ε-term and Λ(e) is a set of critical formulas belonging to e. Now we find terms t 1 , . . . , t k such that replacing e by t i allows us to remove the critical formulas Λ(e), while at the same time replacing the end-formula D(e) by k i=1 D(t i ) and the remaining critical formulas by Γ[t 1 /e], . . . , Γ[t k /e]. We repeat this procedure in such a way that eventually all critical formulas are removed and we are left with a disjunction of instances of E, as required by the first ε-theorem. The difficulty of making this work lies in three challenges. The first is a suitable way of selecting ε-terms e and corresponding critical formulas Λ(e) so that the Λ(e) can be removed. The second is to ensure that in passing from Γ to Γ[t i /e] we again obtain critical formulas. (Replacing an ε-term in a critical formula by another term does in general not result in a critical formula. E.g., let A(y) ≡ B(ε x C(x, y), y) and e ≡ ε x C(x, t) then A(t)[s/e] is B(s, t) but A(εyA(y))[s/e] is just A(εyA(y)). The third challenge is to guarantee that the process eventually terminates with no critical formulas remaining.
We begin by focussing on the first challenge.
Definition 7.1. Suppose Γ ⊢ π Lετ D with critical formulas Γ, and e is an ε-
we say e is the critical ετ -term of C, that e belongs to C, and that e is a critical ετ -term of π.
Lετ D(e) where Λ(e) ∪ Λ(e) ′ are all critical formulas belonging to e. A set of terms s 1 , . . . , s k is an e-elimination set for π and Λ(e) if
If Λ(e) is the set of all critical formulas belonging to e (i.e., Λ ′ (e) = ∅) then an e-elimination set for Λ(e) is called a complete e-elimination set. Proof. Since e is the critical ε-term of C, e ≡ ε x A(x) or e ≡ τ x A(x).
Hence, e cannot occur in A(x), since otherwise it would be a proper subbterm of itself. ⊣
Proof. Any proof of D from Γ using modus ponens and axioms of L remains correct if terms in it are uniformly replaced by other terms. ⊣ Lemma 7.5. In any intermediate logic L:
Proposition 7.6. In Cετ , every critical formula C(e) has an e-elimination set.
Proof. Suppose first that e is an ε-term; then C(e) is A(s) → A(e). Let Λ ′ (e) be the critical formulas belonging to e other than C(e), and Γ the remaining critical formulas for which e is not critical. So we have:
On the one hand, by replacing e everywhere by s we get
and by Lemma 7.5(2), since
On the other hand, since
Γ, ¬A(s) ⊢ C D(e) and so,
by Lemma 7.5(1). Since C ⊢ A(s) ∨ ¬A(s) we have
Thus, {e, s} is an e-elimination set for the critical formula C(e). Similarly, if e is a τ -term and C(e) is A(e) → A(s) we get
and by Lemma 7.5(2), since ¬A(s) ⊢ C ′ ∈ Λ ′ (e) and ¬A(s) ⊢ C(s),
On the other hand, A(s) ⊢ C(e), so
by Lemma 7.5(1). ⊣ This shows that in classical logic, every single critical formula can be eliminated from the proof. More generally, the set of all critical formulas belonging to e has a (complete) e-elimination set in C:
Proposition 7.7. In Cετ , every critical ετ -term has a complete eelimination set.
Proof. Let C 1 ≡ A(s 1 ) → A(e), . . . , C k ≡ A(s k ) → A(e) be the critical formulas belonging to e if e is an ε-term. Since
by Lemma 7.5(2). By applying Lemma 7.5(1),
On the other hand, since ¬A(s i ) ⊢ A(s i ) → A(e), we get ¬A(s 1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ A(s k ) ⊢ C j (e) for each j = 1, . . . , k, so we also have, from the first line by Lemma 7.5(2),
is an instance of excluded middle, we have
If e is a τ -term, then the critical formulas are of the form C j (e) ≡ A(e) → A(s j (e)) and consequently
and consequently
In each case, e, s 1 , . . . , s k is an e-elimination set. ⊣ Remark 7.8. Of course, the fact that in C we have complete eelimination sets can also be obtained by applying Proposition 7.6 kmany times.
Applying it to C 1 (e) results in T 1 = {e, s 1 (e)}, applying it to C 2 (e) in T 2 = {e, s 1 (e), s 2 (e), s 1 (s 2 (e))}, to C 3 in T 3 = {e, s 1 (e), s 2 (e), s 1 (s 2 (e)), s 3 (e), s 1 (s 3 (e)), s 2 (s 3 (e)), s 1 (s 2 (s 3 (e)))}, etc., i.e., the resulting disjunction has 2 k+1 disjuncts, whereas the disjunction resulting from Proposition 7.7 only has k + 1 disjuncts. However, see Remark 9.12.
We know that intermediate logics other than LC m do not have the first ετ -theorem and so not every ετ -term will have complete e-elimination sets. However, if the starting formula E is of a special form, they sometimes do. In the proof for the classical case above, this required excluded middle. But it need not. For instance, if E is negated, then weak excluded middle (¬A ∨ ¬¬A) is enough.
Proposition 7.9. If L ⊢ J, then every ετ -term in an Lετ -proof of ¬D has a complete e-elimination set.
Proof. Let C 1 ≡ A(s 1 ) → A(e), . . . , C k ≡ A(s k ) → A(e) be the critical formulas belonging to e if e is an ε-term. As before, we have
Again as before, we have
and together
is provable from weak excluded middle, the claim is proved. ⊣ §8. Elimination Sets using B m and Lin. We've showed in Theorem 6.2 that the provability B m for some m ≥ 2 is a necessary condition for an intermediate logic to have the first ετ -theorem. In this section, we show that it is also sufficient: if L ⊢ B m for some m, then every critical ετ -term has a complete e-elimination set.
In preparation for the proof we consider an example to illustrate the basic idea. Suppose LC 3 ετ ⊢ D(e) with the set of critical formulas
where terms u and v do not contain e. Let C(e) be the conjunction of these critical formulas. We have C s (e), C t (e), C u (e), C v (e) ⊢ LC 3 D(e).
We'll consider sets of terms X i where X 0 = {e} and X i+1 = {s(x), t(x) : x ∈ X i }. For the sake of readability we will leave out parentheses then writing these terms, e.g., s(t(e)) is abbreviated as ste.
For every w ∈ X 1 we have C(w) ⊢ D(w). So, by applying Lemma 7.5(1) twice, we get:
Thus we get
We have
using Lin. Similarly, C v (e) ⊢ LC3 C v (se) ∨ C s (e), so we have by Lemma 7.5(2):
Repeating this consideration with C(te) ∨ C t (e) yields
Note that each of the four resulting disjunctions has as first disjunct a substitution instance of a critical formula of the form C s (w) or C t (w) where w ∈ X 1 . X 2 are the terms of the form s(w) and t(w). So we can repeat the process, pairing C(s(w)) with C s (w) and C(t(w)) with C t (w), i.e., obtaining C(sse) ∨ C s (se) ∨ C s (e), C(tse) ∨ C t (se) ∨ C s (e), etc. In each case, after distributing and removing conjuncts of the form C u (w) ∨ . . . we are left with now eight disjunctions:
. . .
It remains to show that the formulas on the right of the turnstile are provable in LC 3 . First, consider a formula of the form C i (w) ∨ · · · ∨ C j (e), e.g.,
In each disjunct, the consequent equals the antecedent of the disjunct immediately to the right, i.e., it is a substitution instance of
i.e., of B 3 . Since LC 3 ⊢ B 3 , these are all provable.
If we take D ′ (e) to be the disjunction obtained on the right, we have
and thus also
As C u (u) and C v (v) are of the form A → A this reduces to
and therefore:
Proof. By induction on m. If m = 1, this amounts to the claim:
, which is trivial. Now suppose the claim holds for m. Then
and the claim follows by H. ⊣
Definition 8.2. A critical formula A(t) → A(e) (or A(e) → A(t) is e is a τ -term) is called predicative if e does not occur in t, and impredicative otherwise.
Lemma 8.3. If L ⊢ B m , and ∆(e) are the predicative critical formulas belonging to the ετ -term e. Then ∆(e) has an e-elimination set.
Proof. Suppose Γ, ∆(e), Π(e) ⊢ L D(e), where Π(e) is the set of predicative critical formulas belonging to e.
Suppose Π(e) and ∆(e) consist of, respectively, the critical formulas
The proof generalizes the preceding example: we successively substitute terms for e in such a way that a disjunction of instances of D is implied by substitution instances of the critical formulas in Γ together with a disjunction of the form B m plus the predicative critical formulas Π(e). Once k = m, the disjunction becomes provable from B m . Let T 0 = {e} and T i+1 = {s j (t) : t ∈ T i , j ≤ r}. Let Γ(T ) = {C[t/e] : C ∈ Γ, t ∈ T }. If w is a word over {s 1 , . . . , s r }, i.e., w = s i1 . . . s i k then we write w j (t) for s ij (s ij+1 (. . . s i k (t) . . . )). So e.g., if w = sst then w 1 (e) is s(s(t(e))), w 3 (e) = t(e) and w 4 (e) = e. Let W (m) be the set of all length m words over s 1 , . . . , s r .
We show by induction on m that
where
The induction basis is m = 1. Then
W (1) = {s 1 , . . . , s r },
and so each disjunction in Λ i is just one of the impredicative critical formulas A(s j (e)) → A(e)), i.e., Λ 1 = ∆(e). Likewise, the disjunction on the right is just D(e). So the claim holds by the assumption that Γ, ∆(e), Π(e) ⊢ D(e). Now let v = s i1 . . . s im be a length m word, and
In other words,
The induction hypothesis can then be written as:
By replacing e by t in π, we have Γ(t), Λ(t), Π(t) ⊢ L D(t) and so also
Combining this with the induction hypothesis using Lemma 7.5(1) we have
If we write Ξ ∨ G for {F ∨ G : F ∈ Ξ}, by distributivity,
Recall that t ≡ v 1 (e) where v is a word of length m. The formulas in Π(t) are of the form A(u i ) → A(v 1 (e)), so a formula in Π(t) ∨ C(v) is of the form
Each such formula is implied by A(u i ) → A(e) by Lemma 8.1, which is in Π(e). So we get
Since for each i ≤ r, A(
where w = s i v for some i ≤ r. As every length m + 1 word is of this form for some length m word v, repeating this process for all length m words v thus yields
As we've seen, a formula in Λ m is of the form B m , so in L + B m , we have
Thus, the claim follows by taking T = {e} ∪ T m−1 . If e is a τ -term, the proof proceeds analogously. The resulting formulas in Λ(e) are then of the form (
Proof. As G R is axiomatized by H+Lin, it suffices to show that the formulas are valid in the Gödel logic based on the truth value set [0, 1]. For (1), in any given valuation, one of the A j must be maximal, i.e., A i → A j has value 1 in it for all i. For (2), one of the A j must be minimal. ⊣ Lemma 8.5. Suppose Γ, Π(e) ⊢ L D(e), where Π(e) are the predicative critical formulas A(u j )→A(e) belonging to e, there are no impredicative critical formulas belonging to e, and Γ are critical formulas for which e is not critical. Then Π(e) has a complete e-elimination set.
Proof. First suppose e is an ε-term. Replacing e by u j results in proof showing
If we applying Lemma 7.5(1), we get
The disjunction of conjunctions on the left is provable in L + Lin by Lemma 8.4(1).
If e is a τ -term, we get
and the claim follows by Lemma 8.4(2). ⊣ Theorem 8.6. If L ⊢ B m for some m, then Lετ has complete e-elimination sets.
Proof. Suppose Γ, Π(e), ∆(e) ⊢ L D(e), where Π(e) are the predicative critical formulas belonging to e, ∆(e) the impredicative formulas belonging to e, and Γ are critical formulas for which e is not critical. By Lemma 8.3,
Lin by Proposition 6.4, Lemma 8.5 applies and so j T [u j /e] is a complete e-elimination set. ⊣ Remark 8.7. Note that C = LC 2 , so the results of this section provide alternate methods for computing e-elimination sets for classical logic. §9. The Hilbert-Bernays Elimination Procedure. Recall that the challenges in the proof of the first ετ -theorem include, in addition to the existence of complete elimination sets, guarantees that the new sets Γ[s i /e] are in fact critical formulas (so eliminating a set Λ(e) of critical formulas yields a correct Lετ -proof), and that the process eventually terminates. We now discuss the method used by Hilbert and Bernays in the original proof of the first ε-theorem to ensure this.
Lετ D 1 . A sequence Λ 1 (e 1 ), T 1 , . . . , Λ k (e k ), T k of sets Λ i (e i ) of critical formulas belonging to e i and is an ετ -elimination sequence if for each i:
Lετ D i , where Λ ′ (e) are the critical formulas for e i not in Λ i (e i ) and Γ i the remaining critical formulas in π i , 2. T i is an e i -elimination set for π i and Λ i (e i ) 3.
4. Γ i contains only critical formulas, and
, T i is a complete elimination set for e i ), we say the sequence is a complete elimination sequence.
An ετ -elimination sequence, then, is a sequence of ετ -terms e i and sets of critical formulas Λ(e i ) belonging to it, such that eliminating Λ i (e i ) from proof π i results in a new proof π i+1 of a disjunction of instances of D(e i ) from instances of the critical formulas for which e i is not critical and the remaining critical formlas belonging to e i . Since the definition requires π i to be an ετ -proof, the formulas in Γ[T i ] must here actually be critical formulas.
If an ετ -elimination sequence exists for a formula E and its ετ -proof π 0 , then the first ετ -theorem holds for E.
Proposition 9.2. Suppose π is an Lετ proof of E(u 1 , . . . , u n ) where E(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is ετ -free. Suppose furthermore that an ετ -elimination sequence exists for π. Then there are tuples of terms t i1 , . .
The result follows by induction on k, the length of the ετ -elimination sequence for π. ⊣ For the proof of the first ετ -theorem, then, it is sufficient to show that suitable e-elimination sets always exist and ετ -terms e and sets of associated critical formulas can be successively chosen in such a way as to yield an ετ -elimination sequence for π 1 . Hilbert and Bernays did this by defining a well-ordering of ετ -terms which guarantees that eliminating maximal ετ -terms according to this ordering guarantees that the Γ[T i ] are again critical formulas, and no larger (in the ordering) critical ετ -terms are newly introduced. The ordering is the lexicographic order on two complexity measures of ετ -terms, the rank and degree.
Definition 9.3. An ετ -term e is nested in an ετ -term e ′ if e is a proper subterm of e, i.e., if every occurrence of a variable which is free in e is also free in e ′ .
Definition 9.4. The degree deg(e) of an ετ -term e is defined as follows: 1. deg(e) = 1 iff e contains no nested ετ -terms. 2. deg(e) = max{deg(e 1 ), . . . , deg(e n )} + 1 if e 1 , . . . , e n are all the ετ -terms nested in e. For convenience, let deg(t) = 0 if t is not an ετ -term.
Definition 9.5. An ετ -term e is subordinate to an ετ -term e ′ = ε x A(x) if e occurs in e ′ and x is free in e.
Definition 9.6. The rank rk(e) of an ετ -term e is defined as follows: 1. rk(e) = 1 iff e contains no subordinate ετ -terms. 2. rk(e) = max{rk(e 1 ), . . . , rk(e n )} + 1 if e 1 , . . . , e n are all the ετ -terms subordinate to e.
Lemma 9.7. If e is a substitution instance of e ′ , rk(e) = rk(e ′ ).
Lemma 9.8. Suppose e is an ετ -term, t any term, and C is a critical formula for which e is not critical of rank not greater than that of e. Then C[t/e] is a critical formula;
Proof. Suppose C ≡ B(s) → B(ε y B(y)). If e is a subterm of C, it is a subterm of B(y) or of s. To see this, note that, first, e cannot be a subterm of B(ε y B(y)) without being a subterm of B(y), since e is not critical for C and so we have e ≡ ε y B(y).
Second, if e were a subterm of B(s) but not of B(y) or of s, we would have y) ), i.e., ε y B(y). Thus, ε y B(y) has higher rank than e, contrary to assumption.
So e is a subterm of B(y) or of s. We can write B(y) as B ′ (y, e), s as s(e), and
which is a critical formula. (The same applies if C is a formula critical for a τ -term.) ⊣ Lemma 9.9. Suppose e is an ετ -term, t any term, and C is a critical formula for which e is not critical of rank not greater than that of e, and if of the same rank, not of higher degree. Then C[t/e] is not of higher rank than e, and if it is of the same rank it is not of higher degree.
Proof. We have seen that e can occur as a subterm in C only as a subterm of s alone, or as a subterm of B(y). In the former case, C[t/e] is B(s ′ )→B(ε y B(y)), and the critical ετ -term of C[t/e] is the same as that of C. By assumption, e is a critical ετ -term of maximal degree among those of maximal rank.
In the latter case, e is a nested subterm of ε y B(y). Since ε y B(y) is of higher degree than its subterm e, ε y B(y) must be of lower rank than e by assumption. Rank is preserved under replacement of nested subterms, so [ε y B(y)][t/e] has the same rank as ε y B(y) and consequently lower rank than e. ⊣ Proposition 9.10. Suppose π is an Lετ proof of E(u 1 , . . . , u n ) where E(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is ετ -free. Suppose furthermore that for every Lετ proof and critical ετ -term e there is a complete e-elimination set. Then there is a complete ετ -elimination sequence for π.
Proof. Take π 0 = π. Suppose π i has been defined. Let e i be a critical ετ -term of π i of maximal degree among the critical terms of maximal rank. Let Λ i (e i ) be all critical formulas belonging to e i , and Γ i the remaining critical formulas. We have
By assumption, there is a complete e-elimination set T i for Λ i (e i ) and so we have π i+1 showing that
Each critical formula C in Γ i is not of higher rank than e i , and if it is of equal rank it is not of higher degree. So by Lemma 9.8, C[t/e i ] is a critical formulas.
Eventually, Γ i = ∅, since in each step, by Lemma 9.9, the maximal rank of critical ετ -terms in Γ i does not increase, the maximal degree of critical ετ -terms of maximal rank does not increase, and the number of critical ετ -terms of maximal degree among those of maximal rank decreases. ⊣ Corollary 9.11. The first ετ -theorem holds for C.
Proof. By Proposition 7.7, every critical ετ -term has complete elimination sets. So by Proposition 9.10, there always is an elimination sequence. The first ετ -theorem follows by Proposition 9.2. ⊣ Remark 9.12. The traditional procedure following the Hilbert-Bernays order, which eliminates all critical formulas belonging to a maximal ετ -term together, is not the only possible procedure that guarantees termination. Despite the fact that, pointed out in Remark 7.8, using Proposition 7.6 for all critical formulas belonging to a single ετ -term results in a larger disjunction than Proposition 7.7, the ability in the classical case to eliminate single critical formulas provides flexibility that can be exploited to produce smaller overall Herbrand disjunctions. As Baaz, Leitsch, and Lolic [2018, Theorem 3] show, there are sequences of ετ -proofs where the original procedure produces Herbrand disjunctions that are non-elementarily larger than a more efficient elimination order.
Theorem 9.13. The first ετ -theorem holds for negated formulas in any Lετ such that L ⊢ J, e.g., KCετ and LCετ .
Proof. L has complete e-elimination sets for negated end-formulas by Proposition 7.9. Note that J, i.e., ¬A∨¬¬A, follows intuitionistically from (A→¬A)∨ (¬A → A), which is an instance of Lin. So LC ⊢ J. ⊣ Theorem 9.14. The first ετ -theorem holds for LC m ετ .
Proof. By Theorem 8.6. ⊣ Theorem 9.15. The first ετ -theorem holds in LCετ for ετ -free formulas.
Since D is ετ -free, by Theorem 9.14, LC m ⊢ D. In general LC ⊢ D iff LC m ⊢ D for all m, so the claim follows.
⊣ §10. Herbrand's Theorem and the Second Epsilon-Theorem. The first ετ -theorem implies Herbrand's theorem for purely existential formulas. If E ≡ ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n E ′ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is provable in predicate logic, then so is E ετ ≡ E ′ (e 1 , . . . , e n ) for some ε-terms e 1 , . . . , e n . From the first ε-theorem we then obtain a proof in propositional logic of a Herbrand disjunction
for some terms t ij . In predicate logic, we may now successively introduce existential quantifiers to obtain the original formula E. This holds in any intermediate predicate logic in which the first ετ -theorem holds, since the only principles used in the last step (proving E from its Herbrand disjunction) are A(t)→∃x A(x) and
, (x not free in B) which already hold in intuitionistic logic. (Despite the failure of the first ετ -theorem in LCετ , the Herbrand theorem for existential formulas does hold in QLC; see Aschieri [2017] ). For classical predicate logic, the Herbrand theorem for existential formulas implies the Herbrand theorem for prenex formulas. If a prenex formula E has a proof in first-order logic, so does its (purely existential) Herbrand form H(E) = ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n E ′ (x 1 , . . . , x n ). In classical predicate logic, we can obtain not just H(E) from its Herbrand disjunction, but also the original prenex formula E. This requires that we introduce not just existential quantifiers, but also universal quantifiers. Consequently, we need not just the generalization rule A(x)/∀x A(x) but also a principle that allows us to shift universal quantifiers over disjunctions, viz.,
This principle is not intuitionistically valid: it characterizes Kripke frames with constant domains. Since the implication E →H(E) already holds in intuitionistic logic, any intermediate predicate logic in which CD holds and which has the first ε-theorem also has Herbrand's theorem for prenex formulas. Although the first ε-theorem implies Herbrand's theorem for prenex formulas (at least if CD is present), the converse is not true. As we showed, the first ετ -theorem does holds for an intermediate predicate logic only if its propositional fragment proves B m for some m. In particular, it does not hold for infinite-valued first-order Gödel logics G R . However, Herbrand's theorem for prenex formulas does hold for G R Baaz, Preining, and Zach [2007, Theorem 7.8] . (Incidentally, the Herbrand theorem for prenex formulas also holds in intuitionistic logic despite the invalidity of CD ; see Bowen [1976] ).
In classical logic, the second ε-theorem can be proved using the first one as follows: Suppose Cετ ⊢ A ετ . Since A is equivalent to a prenex formula P A in classical logic, we have QC ⊢ A → P A . Prenex formulas imply their Herbrand forms, i.e., QC ⊢ P A → H(P A ). Together we have QC ⊢ A → H(P A ) and by translating into the ετ -calculus, Cετ ⊢ A ετ → H(P A ) ετ , so Cετ ⊢ H(P A ) ετ . By the first ετ -theorem, H(P A ) has a Herbrand disjunction, from which (in QC) we can prove P A and hence A.
The steps that may fail in an intermediate prediate logic QL, other than the first ετ -theorem, are the provability of A ↔ P A and proving P A from the Herbrand disjunction of H(P A ). These steps do work provided all quantifier shifts can be can be carried out (i.e., in addition to CD also the formulas Q ∀ and Q ∃ ). Thus, if Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, any intermediate predicate QL with propositional fragment L in which all quantifier shifts are provable also has the second ετ -theorem.
Proposition 10.1. If QL is an intermediate predicate logic with propositional fragment L, QL proves CD , Q ∃ , and Q ∀ , and Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, it also has the second ετ -theorem.
Proof. Suppose Lετ ⊢ A ετ . The ετ -calculus proves ετ -translations of all quantifier shifts, so Lετ ⊢ (A P ) ετ , and since
Since QL ⊢ Q ∃ and QL ⊢ Q ∀ , also QL ⊢ A P → A, and so QL ⊢ A. ⊣ Infinite-valued first-order Gödel logic G R is an intermediate prediate logic which proves CD but not Q ∀ or Q ∃ , and in it the first ετ -theorem does not hold. The logics of linear Kripke frames with m worlds (and varying domains) are QLC m . LC m ετ has the first ετ -theorem, but does not prove CD . However, finite-valued first-order Gödel logics G m do prove CD , Q ∃ , and Q ∀ , and so also have the second ετ -theorem.
Herbrand's theorem also yield other results, for instance the following. Proof. The "only if" direction is trivial since QL 1 ⊆ QL 2 . For the "only if" direction, assume QL 2 ⊢ A. Then there is a Herbrand disjunction A ′ of A provable in L and hence in QL 1 . Since QH ⊢ A ′ → A, also QL 1 ⊢ A. Now suppose in addition that QL 1 ⊢ CD and QL 2 ⊢ A with A prenex. Then since QH ⊢ A → H(A), QL 2 ⊢ H(A). By Herbrand's theorem there is a Herbrand disjunction A ′ and L ⊢ A ′ . From A ′ , QL 1 can prove A, using just intuitionistically valid inferences as well as CD . ⊣ Since infinite-valued Gödel logic G R has Herbrand's theorem, the existential fragments of QLC and G R agree. Whenever the first ετ -theorem holds for Lετ , Herbrand's theorem for existential formulas also holds for any predicate logic containing L. So, whenever an intermediate predicate logic QL 1 ⊆ QL 2 , their propositional fragment L are the same, and Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, their purely existential fragments agree. For instance, the result holds for QLC m and its extensions (e.g., by the constant domain axiom CD ) for existential formulas. By similar reasoning, the result holds for formulas of the form ∃ x ¬A( x) for KC and its extensions. By Proposition 6.7, the result can also be extended to formulas of the form ∀ y B( y) → ∃ x A( x). §11. Elimination of Critical Formulas using Lin. In the classical case, the first ε-theorem is obtained by successively eliminating critical formulas belonging to a single ε-term using excluded middle. In intermediate logics this is not available, but as we have seen in the proof of Theorem 8.6, critical formulas can also be eliminated using B m and Lin. And in fact, if a critical ετ -term e has only predicative critical formulas then it has a complete e-elimination set (by Lemma 8.5) already in LC, since only Lin is required to eliminate predicative critical formulas. Thus, the procedure of the first ετ -theorem terminates for all ετ -proofs in which no impredicative critical formulas occurs during the successive elimination of critical formulas.
Proposition 11.1. If LCετ ⊢ E(u 1 , . . . , u n ) and there is an elimination sequence π i , Λ i (e i ), T i in which each formula in Λ i (e i ) is predicative, then LC ⊢ E(t i1 , . . . , t in ).
Proof. By Proposition 9.2, since if in each step of the elimination sequence the eliminated critical formulas are all predicative, the elimination already works in LC by Lemma 8.5. ⊣ So if there is a way to select critical ετ -terms e i successively for elimination in such way that the critical formulas belonging to e i are always predicative, the first ετ -theorem holds in LCετ for a particular proof π. However, it is hard to determine just by inspecting π if this is possible. For one, it is not sufficient that the critical formulas in π itself are all predicative: eliminating the critical formulas belonging to one critical ετ -term may turn a remaining predicative critical formula into an impredicative one. For instance, consider
Then D(e A , e B ) has an LCετ proof, since it is the conjunction of the critical formulas
which are both predicative. If we first eliminate e A we would replace e A by f (e B ) in the second, resulting in
which is impredicative. Similarly, eliminating e B leaves the impredicative
So no elimination sequence resulting in only predicative critical formulas at every step is possible.
Of course, if the term t in a critical formula A(t)→A(e) contains no ετ -term at all, it is predicative, and replacing some ετ -term e ′ in it by a term t ′ cannot result in an impredicative critical formula. Let us call such critical formulas weak.
Definition 11.2. A critical formula A(t)→A(ε x A(x)) resp. A(τ x A(x))→A(t) is weak in π if t does not contain any critical ε-or τ -term of π.
If the critical formulas in π are all weak, there is an elimination sequence.
Proposition 11.3. Suppose LCετ ⊢ E(e 1 , . . . , e n ) with a proof in which all critical formulas are weak. Then there are terms t j i such that LC ⊢ j E(t j 1 , . . . , t j n ). Proof. Take a critical ετ -term e of maximum degree among those of maximal rank in π, let Γ(e) be the critical formulas belonging to e, Γ the remaining critical formulas, and suppose the edn-formula is D(e). Since all criticial formulas A(u) → A(e) (or A(e) → A(u)) are weak, e does not occur in u, i.e., all critical formulas in Γ(e) are predicative. By Lemma 8.5, e has an e-elimination set T , and correspondingly Γ[T ] ⊢ LC t D(t). However, since the critical formulas in Γ are also weak, they do not contain e, hence Γ[T ] = Γ. The result follows by the same inductive proof as the first ετ -theorem. ⊣ The first ετ -theorem guarantees the existence of Herbrand disjunctions for existential theorems, i.e., if E ≡ ∃x 1 . . . x n D(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ⊢ E then ⊢ i D(t 1i , . . . , t ni ). The existence of a Herbrand disjunction, conversely, guarantees the existence of a proof of E ετ for which a predicative elimination sequence exists.
ετ for which a predicative elimination sequence exists.
Proof. We give an example only.
Then both
are also predicative critical formulas. Together we have a proof of
is an elimination sequence. In fact it is an elimination sequence following Hilbert's ordering, since e ′ has higher rank than e(s 1 ) and e(s 2 ). In each step, only predicative critical formulas are generated. It produces the original Herbrand disjunction.
⊣ §12. The First ετ -Theorem and Order Induction. In arithmetic, the usual methods for eliminating critial formulas based on the first ε-theorem do not work; and so consistency proofs for systems based on the ε-calculus there use other methods such as the ε-substitution method (see Ackermann [1940] and Moser [2006] ; the history of the two approaches is discussed in Zach [2004] ). The methods developed for the first ε-theorem to eliminate predicative critical formulas from proofs in LCετ above can, however, also be applied in classical theories of order (including arithmetic). Suppose T is a universal theory involving a relation <, and consider the order induction rule IR < ,
We denote by ⊢ < the derivability relation generated by classical logic extended by IR < . The resulting system is equivalent to adding to classical first-order logic the order induction principle for <,
Proof. The "only if" direction follows by observing that if
and so A(t) follows from IP < and ∀x A(x) → A(t) by modus ponens. For the "if" direction, let P A be
Then by logic,
by IR < , and so
Now consider the classical ε-calculus extended by critical formulas of the form
These critical formulas are obviously equivalent to Hilbert's "critical formulas of the second form," A(t) → ε x A(x) ≤ t, over a theory that proves that < is trichotomous. If A is derivable from T and ordinary critical formulas for ε-terms and critical formulas of this second kind, we write T ⊢ <ε A. The standard translation A ε of a formula A is defined as in Definition 3.3, except ∀x A(x) ε = A ε (ε x ¬A ε (x)). Then we can show:
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.4. We just have to deal with application of IR < . Suppose we have a derivation of the ε-translation of the premise of IR < , (e(y) < y → A ε (e(y)) → A ε (y)
where e(y) ≡ ε x ¬(x < y → A ε (x)) is the ε-term used in the translation of ∀x(x < y → A(x)). By substituting e ′ ≡ ε z ¬A ε (z) for y throughout the proof, we obtain
Take the critical formula of second kind ¬A ε (t) → ¬t < ε z ¬A ε (z) and let t be e(e ′ ). By contraposition, we have e(e ′ ) < e ′ → A ε (e(e ′ )) and so
by modus ponens. The conclusion of IR < , A ε (t), now follows from an ordinary critical formula belonging to ¬A ε (z), viz.,
⊣ Arithmetic does not have a Herbrand theorem, and thus also no first ε-theorem. However, Herbrand disjunctions exists for formulas ∃ x E( x) iff the critical formulas belonging to the ε-terms e 1 , . . . , e n in the standard ε-translation E ε (e 1 , . . . , e n ) of ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n E(x 1 , . . . , x n ) can be eliminated by a predicative elimination sequence. This mirrors the situation in LC discussed in Section 11. The proof that critical formulas can be eliminated if a predicative elimination sequence exists is similar. Corresponding to Lemma 8.4 we'll need the following:
Lemma 12.3. Let V be a finite set of variables and assume that
Then T ⊢ x∈V y∈V ¬y < x.
Proof. Suppose not. Then T + x∈V y∈V y < x would be satisfiable. Let M and s be the corresponding structure and variable assignment. Fix x 1 ∈ V . Since M, s |= y∈V y < x 1 , for some x 2 ∈ V , s(x 2 ) < M s(x 1 ). Continuing, we obtain x 1 , . . . , x n such that s(x i+1 ) < M s(x i ) for any n. Since V is finite, eventually x i ≡ x i+k , contradicting the assumption that any model of T makes < irreflexive and transitive. ⊣ Theorem 12.4. Suppose T is as in Lemma 12.3.
. . , t ni ) for some terms t ij iff there is a derivation of E ε (e 1 , . . . , e n ) which has a predicative elimination sequence.
Proof. For the "only if" part, proceed as in the procedure outlined in the proof of Proposition 11.4. For the "if" part, we have to show that if the critical formulas belonging to an ε-term are predicative, they can be eliminated. Without loss of generality we may assume that for each term t i , a corresponding critical formula of first and of second kind are both present. So suppose e is a critical ε-term and Θ, Γ, Π(e), Π ′ (e) ⊢ <ε D(e) where Π(e) and and Π ′ (e) consist of, respectively,
A(t 1 ) → ¬t 1 < e, . . . , A(t m ) → ¬t m < e, and Θ consists of instances of formulas in T .
and let Π V (e) be the critical formulas with terms t i ∈ V and Π W \V (e) = Π(e) \ Π V (e), and similarly for Π ′ V (e) and Π ′ T \V (e). Since ¬A(t) ⊢ A(t) → B, we have C V ⊢ Π W \V (e) and C V ⊢ Π ′ W \V (e), and so
Since the critical formulas in Π(e) are predicative, t i does not contain e and so
for each t i ∈ V and consequently
Since this is true for every V ⊆ W , we get
if we let Ξ = {B V : V ⊆ W } where B V is t∈V u∈V (A(u) → ¬u < t). Now V ⊆W C V is itself provable in classical logic. So as the result of one elimination step, we get
If there is a predicative elimination sequence, we have in the end terms t ij such that
where Θ ′ are all the instances of formulas of T produced in the elimination, and Ξ ′ are all the formulas of the form B V , possibly with epsilon terms replaced by other terms. T ⊢ A for each A ∈ Θ ′ . By Lemma 12.3, T ⊢ t∈V u∈V ¬u < t and so each formula B V ∈ Ξ ′ is also provable from T . Together we have,
E(t 1i , . . . , t ni ) ⊣ §13. Open Problems. We have investigated the ετ -calculi for intermediate logics, with a focus on the first ετ -theorem. We showed that the only intermediate logics with an unrestriced first ετ -theorem are the finite-valued Gödel ogics LC m , but obtained partial results for formulas of specific form or with specific kinds of proofs.
The natural next question to investigate is the second ε-theorem, i.e., to investigate extended ετ -calculi for intermediate predicate logics and characterize those logics for which the extended ετ -calculus is conservative. We have shown that Lετ proves all quantifier shifts, so Lετ is not conservative over any QL where these are not provable. Note that this question is not automatically settled by the answer to the question of which logics have the first ετ -theorem. Rather, it is a question orthogonal and requires other proof systems for a proper investigation, such as sequent calculi for ετ -terms. For instance, Aguilera and Baaz [2019, Theorem 5.4 ] that the standard translation Γ ⇒ D ε of a sequent Γ ⇒ D is provable in a sequent calculus LJ ε for intuitionistic logic iff Γ ⇒ D is provable in a special version LJ ++ of intuitionistic sequent calculus which is globally sound but allows violation of the eigenvariable condition. LJ ++ in turn proves Γ ⇒ D iff LJ + CD + Q ∀ + Q ∃ ⊢ Γ ⇒ D (Proposition 4.4). In other words, the second ε-theorem holds for intutionistic predicate logic with all quantifier shifts. The methods used here are closely related to the study of the behavior of skolem functions in intermediate logics (of which ετ -terms are in many ways a syntactic variant), see, e.g., Iemhoff [2019] . As mentioned in the introduction, other approaches to adding ε-operators to intuitionistic logic yield systems that are conservative over the original logic. Work on skolemization in intuitionistic logic is relevant here, and suggests that conservative ε-calculi can be obtained by introducing existence predicates. The proof-theoretic approaches in the literature would benefit also from a complementary model-theoretic study. A Kripke-style semantics for ετ -terms, with or without existence predicate, is still lacking (but see DeVidi [1995] for a semantics based on Heyting algebras).
In Section 11 we gave sufficient conditions for when ετ -terms can be eliminated from a proof π in LCετ . Are there better (weaker) criteria that apply to more proofs? For instance, there may be certain kinds of orderings such that if the critical ετ -terms in π and corresponding "witness terms" can be put into such an ordering, an elimination sequence in which only predicative critical formulas exists. §14. Appendix: Bell and DeVidi on intuitionistic ετ -calculi. Bell [1993] pointed out that if ∀x A(x) is axiomatically defined as A(ε x ¬A(x)), then the intuitionistically invalid formula
becomes provable if we add critical ε-formulas to intuitionistic first-order logic QH as well as the axioms ∀x A(x)↔A(ε x ¬A(x)) and ∃x A(x)↔A(ε x A(x)). This remains true if we consider a pure ε-calculus for intuitionistic logic and translate ∀x A(x) as A(ε x ¬A(x)). For the translation of ¬∀x A(x) and ∃x ¬A(x) would then coincide: ¬A(ε x ¬A(x)). However, the corresponding critical formula A(ε x ¬A(x)) → A(t) is not derivable. This is the reason we add the τ operator, and translate ∀x A(x) as A(τ x A(x)). As DeVidi [1995, Theorem 4] pointed out, QH with the addition of critical τ -formulas also proves Q. This remains the case in the pure ετ -calculus for intuitionistic logic: Hετ ⊢ Q ετ . For Q ετ is ¬A(τ x A(x)) → ¬A(ε x ¬A(x)), which is a critical ε-formula. This means that the translations of all four ¬-quantifier shifts are provable in Hετ , as the other three, Likewise, in QH, we only have ¬∃x¬A(x) → ∀x¬¬A(x).
In the same paper, Bell claims to have shown that the intuitionistic ε-calculus is not conservative over H (with identity). The proof, however, requires additional assumptions, i.e., it is not claimed for pure intuitionistic logic. Specifically, the claim is that D ⊢ QHετ M where M is ¬(B ∧ C) → (¬B ∨ ¬C)
and where where D is ∀x(x = a ∨ ¬x = a). M is an intuitionistically invalid direction of De Morgan's laws. Since the shadow D s of D is the (obviously intuitionistically valid) ⊤ ∨ ¬⊤, this seems to contradict Lemma 5.2.
The proof proceeds as follows: Let A(x) be (x = a ∧ B) ∨ (x = a ∧ C). Then,
and consequently, by intuitionistically valid contraposition The problem with this argument is that (*) is false. In fact,
is not true in any one-element model when C is false. (Theorem 7 of DeVidi [1995] fails for the same reason; the assumption a = b is required.) Bell provides another proof of M in intuitionistic ε-calculus without invoking Q, but this requires, in addition to D, the assumption a = b. DeVidi [1995] shows that in the intuitionistic ετ -calculus, D ∧ a = b derives Lin.
8 However, since the shadow of a = b is ¬⊤, this proof does not conflict with our Lemma 5.2. Bell's other examples of intuitionistically invalid propositional formulas provable in ετ -calculi all require assumptions of the form a = b and also the axiom of ε-extensionality. The examples of derivations of M and Lin in intuitionistic ετ -calculus given by Mulvihill [2015] avoid identity but require the assumptions ∀x((P (x) → P (a)) ∨ ¬(P (x) → P (a))) and ¬(P (a) → P (b)).
